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KING’S DOMAIN
Mila Sohoni*
In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court called the tax-credit provision of the Affordable
Care Act ambiguous—but then invoked the major questions exception to Chevron deference and
proceeded to resolve the provision’s meaning for itself. Litigants and commentators quickly recognized that King had the potential to destabilize Chevron. If King exempts from Chevron
deference anything that is “major,” then Chevron’s significance will necessarily be diminished,
as agencies will only enjoy deference on their answers to questions of “minor” import; the major
questions exception may swallow Chevron’s rule.
This Essay, prepared for a symposium held by the Notre Dame Law Review, traces
King’s domain and shows how it leaves untouched much of Chevron’s domain. King was
correctly decided in the particular context in which it arose—the context in which an agency was
interpreting an ambiguous statute to authorize broad-scale spending by the federal government.
De novo review in this domain finds support in cases both old and new; it accords with constitutional values; and it need not spill over to other types of administrative law disputes. Courts can
thus comfortably give King its due force within the domain it addressed. By the same token,
however, courts should refrain from applying King beyond that domain, to block judicial deference to regulatory agency action that does not involve the generation of large amounts of federal
spending. King and Chevron currently seem at war, but they can exist in détente. The federal
courts should preserve this détente as Congress deliberates on the questions of fundamental regulatory reform currently pending before it.

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell1 was “breathtakingly
important.”2 The plaintiffs in that suit argued that the IRS incorrectly interpreted the Affordable Care Act to authorize the payment of refundable tax
credits on a health insurance exchange established by the federal govern© 2018 Mila Sohoni. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Mila Sohoni, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. For helpful
comments and conversations on this Essay or its earlier incarnations, many thanks to Sam
Bagenstos, Nick Bagley, Chris Egleson, Andy Grewal, Kristin Hickman, Gillian Metzger,
Zach Price, Richard Re, Miriam Seifter, and Asher Steinberg. I am also grateful to the
symposium organizers and student editors of the Notre Dame Law Review, and to the other
symposium participants.
1 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
2 John F. Manning, Essay, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV.
2397, 2397 (2017).
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ment, although the statute made those credits available only on an exchange
“established by the State.”3 The Supreme Court rejected this challenge.
The practical consequence of the Court’s decision for health care
reform was obvious: King let the IRS pay tax credits on the federal health
insurance exchange, and so sustained a central part of the ACA’s insurance
market reforms by allowing individuals to purchase federally subsidized
health insurance plans. King thus preserved the substantive result achieved
by the agency action at issue in that case. But the method the Court used to
reach this result was unexpected. Instead of deferring to the agency, the
Court—by invoking the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference4—
proceeded to resolve the statute’s meaning for itself.
King is a uniquely important major questions case. Earlier decisions
applying the major questions exception held that Congress had resolved the
major question in a way that foreclosed the agency’s reading of the statute.5
The other major questions cases are therefore “just” pure statutory interpretation cases in that they held that the statute did not authorize the result the
agency sought. In King, however, the statute did not foreclose the agency’s
reading of the statute; indeed, the King Court ultimately concluded that the
statute “compel[led]” the result the agency wanted to reach.6 King limited
Congress’s power to delegate to the agency the authority to read the statute a
particular way, while reserving to the Court the power to read the statute in
exactly the same way. Because of this Step Zero holding,7 King—and only

3 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–47 (2006).
5 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Response, Short-Circuiting the New Major
Questions Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 150 (2017); Michael Coenen & Seth
Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 787–96 (2017); Sunstein, supra
note 4, at 243 (arguing that MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994),
and FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), are Step One cases). Commentators
have disagreed on whether Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), is a
Step One or a Step Two case. Compare Coenen & Davis, supra, at 790 (describing UARG),
and Barnett & Walker, supra, at 150, with Asher Steinberg, Another Addition to the Chevron
Anticanon: Judge Kavanaugh on the “Major Rules” Doctrine, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (May 7,
2017, 8:44 PM) http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/05/another-addition-tochevron-anticanon.html. For my purposes in this Essay, the important point is that UARG
is not a Step Zero case.
6 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93 (“Here, the statutory scheme compels us to reject petitioners’ interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any
State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress
designed the Act to avoid.”).
7 For a novel reconceptualization of King’s location in the Chevron analysis, see Cary
Coglianese, Foreword: Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1374 (2017)
(arguing that King is not a Step Zero case); see id. at 1357 n.104 (“The [King] Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous at Step 1 but that it could not reach Step 2 because
of an Interstitial Step.”); id. at 1361 (locating the major questions inquiry at “Step 1.2” of
the decision tree).
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King8—is a case that is not just about proper statutory interpretation, but also
about nondelegation itself.
King’s use of the major questions exception has provoked a great deal of
commentary, much of it negative.9 A growing body of scholarship has criticized the major questions exception on a variety of scores—for its uncertain
contours,10 its susceptibility to judicial manipulation,11 and its capacity to
corrode the powers of agencies.12 Because the major questions exception is
flawed, and because King appeared to broaden and entrench the major questions exception, it seems to follow that King committed a dangerous blunder—or so contend many of King’s critics.
To some extent, these worries have been ratified. Litigants have leveraged King’s major questions holding in “a number of high-profile challenges
to federal regulations.”13 And each case that relies upon King’s major questions exception threatens to gradually chip away at Chevron’s domain.14 If
King exempts from Chevron anything that is “major,” then Chevron’s significance will necessarily shrink, as agencies will only enjoy deference on their
answers to questions of “minor” import. Chevron and King are locked in a
(Step) zero-sum game.
8 In City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013), the Court declined to recognize
an exception at Step Zero for jurisdictional questions, notwithstanding how “big” and
“important” such questions might be. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 791. In Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), the Court seemed to use the major questions exception
at Step Zero, but it treated it as just one of a multitude of considerations that barred the
conclusion that Congress had delegated interpretive authority to the agency. See Barnett &
Walker, supra note 5, at 150 n.14; Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 794 n.80. King thus
stands as the sole case in which the major questions exception alone drove a Step Zero
determination not to defer to the agency.
9 Barnett & Walker, supra note 5, at 153 (“Scholars have not treated the Court’s application of the major questions doctrine to step zero in King v. Burwell kindly . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2606 (2006) (“To say the least, no simple line separates minor
or interstitial from major questions. . . . In any case, expertise and accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal fiction, are highly relevant to the resolution of major questions.
Contrary to Justice Breyer’s suggestion, there is no reason to think that Congress would
want courts, rather than agencies, to resolve major questions.”).
11 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017).
12 See, e.g., Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to “Major Questions”: A Progressive Theory of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); cf. Stephanie
Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 40
(noting that the application of the major questions doctrine at Step Zero or Step One—as
opposed to Step Two—has the benefit of “foreclos[ing] a subsequent presidential administration from reinterpreting the statute via regulation”).
13 Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV.
1095, 1102 (2016); see Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 796 (“There is a growing stack of
briefs and motions in the lower courts arguing that King has changed the interpretive
landscape by disallowing Chevron deference in cases that otherwise would fall firmly within
Chevron’s domain.”).
14 See Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 799 (“Precisely because King broke new
ground, it casts uncertainty over the scope of Chevron’s domain.”).
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This Essay reconciles Chevron and King by tracing the boundaries of what
we might think of as “King’s domain.”15 King arose in a specific and rather
unusual context: it was a case in which an agency interpreted ambiguous statutory authority to create federal spending without clear congressional
authorization. The King Court’s choice not to invoke Chevron in that context
is consistent with caselaw concerning appropriations and spending.16 King’s
eschewal of Chevron deference at Step Zero should be understood to be confined to this domain rather than as undercutting deference to major regulatory activity that does not trigger spending by the federal government. Put
another way, Chevron and King are in détente, rather than in conflict. And,
for reasons more fully discussed below, courts should maintain that détente
as Congress decides on the proposals for fundamental regulatory reform currently pending before it.
I.

KING’S ELEPHANT

To understand King, it is necessary to review briefly the context in which
it arose: in litigation concerning the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA
was intended to expand access to affordable health insurance to millions of
Americans. To secure that aim, the ACA created a complex and interlocking
scheme of subsidies and mandates. “The subsidies took various forms and
flowed to different recipients. For insurers, there were cost-sharing reduction payments, risk-adjustment payments, reinsurance payments, and risk-corridor payments. For individuals, there were premium tax credits.”17 By
creating these subsidies, Congress “enabled insurers to offer plans at affordable prices,” and “enabled consumers to purchase those affordably priced
plans.”18
The difficulty was that the rushed and unusual circumstances of the
ACA’s passage left several problems in the statutory text.19 The challengers
in King focused on one of these problems: the provisions that dealt with
refundable tax credits. The ACA authorized the provision of such tax credits
15 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001).
16 I have argued elsewhere that administrative law’s ordinary justifications for deferring to agencies do not translate to the domain in which agencies are relying on interpretations of ambiguous statutory authority to trigger large-scale spending by the federal
government to secure certain economic rights. See Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference:
Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701–24 (2017) (arguing that
several factors—including the relative unlikelihood of judicial review; the increased possibility of entrenchment; and heightened concerns over the absence of agency expertise,
democratic accountability, and transparency—distinguish this form of executive branch
policymaking from executive branch regulatory policymaking). My concern here is different: to examine King’s relationship to Chevron and to set forth how they can be reconciled.
17 Id. at 1687.
18 Id.
19 See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (2015); Manning, supra note 2, at
2399 n.12.
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for purchases of plans on “an Exchange established by [a] State.”20 The IRS,
however, regarded the provision as authorizing it to make tax credits available to purchasers on the federal exchange—Healthcare.gov.21 If the
Agency’s determination were rejected and the challengers were to prevail,
the consequences would be lethal for the ACA: the insurance markets in over
thirty states would collapse because federal money could no longer flow to
purchasers of plans in those states.22
Ultimately, the government won King, with a six-Justice majority holding
that the ACA authorized the provision of tax credits on both the federal and
state exchanges.23 For health care reform, the consequences were clear: the
ACA’s insurance market reforms would survive to fight another day. But for
administrative law, the consequences of the Court’s opinion were more difficult to parse. The King Court rejected the argument that the IRS was entitled to Chevron deference, “brushing the case aside like a slightly annoying
but unthreatening bug.”24 This startled many observers, particularly because
King did not hold that the ACA was clear or unambiguous, which is the usual
reason courts decline to apply Chevron.25 To the contrary, the Court stated
that the statutory provision concerning tax credits was ambiguous,26 yet
nonetheless declined to defer under Chevron. “This is not a case for the IRS,”
the Court reasoned; “[i]t is instead our task to determine the correct reading
of Section 36B.”27
On the question of why the IRS was not entitled to resolve this statutory
ambiguity, King offered a single, dense paragraph. First, the Court noted,
the tax credits are among the ACA’s “key reforms.”28 Second, the Court
pointed out that the tax credits “involv[e] billions of dollars in spending each
year and affect[ ] the price of health insurance for millions of people,” making the availability of those tax credits “a question of deep ‘economic and
20 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3)(A)
(2012)).
21 See id.
22 See id. at 2493–94.
23 Id. at 2496.
24 Michael Herz, Essay, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1868 (2015).
25 For a list of other offered rationales that the Court did not use, see Jonathan H.
Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism,
2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 50–51. Although it was evident at oral argument that
certain federalism arguments had caught the Justices’ eyes, the Court also eschewed reliance on federalism concerns. Id. at 51–52. See generally Mila Sohoni, Essay, The Problem
with “Coercion Aversion”: Novel Questions and the Avoidance Canon, 32 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE
1 (2015) (urging the Court not to decide King by application of the constitutional avoidance canon to avoid the novel federalism problem asserted to have been created by the
challengers’ reading of the statute).
26 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491 (“The upshot of all this is that the phrase ‘an Exchange
established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]’ is properly viewed as ambiguous.”
(alteration in original)).
27 Id. at 2489.
28 Id.
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political significance.’”29 Third, the Court stressed that the agency claiming
the delegated authority to decide the question was “the IRS,” an agency that
“has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”30 King, in
short, offered a “grab bag of reasons”31 for its refusal to defer.
Clearly, the most important element of the “grab bag” was the Court’s
invocation of Brown & Williamson’s language on questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance.’”32 The Brown & Williamson case is now the
canonical cite for the “major questions exception” to Chevron—the idea that
Congress does not delegate authority to answer questions of major economic
and political significance implicitly, but instead does so explicitly. As the
Court elsewhere phrased it, Congress does not “hide elephants in
mouseholes.”33
This “elephants in mouseholes” element of King has caused some consternation. Several perceive in this opinion the spreading symptoms of an
incipient across-the-board pushback against the very foundation of Chevron
deference34—perhaps an effort by Chief Justice Roberts to establish as controlling doctrine the principles that underpinned his dissenting opinion in
City of Arlington.35 Commentators have worried that King augurs that the
Court will deprive agencies of authority to resolve precisely the kinds of
major questions that agencies are best equipped to resolve36—say, the regulation of genetically modified foods, cholesterol-lowering drugs, air pollution,
or workplace safety.37 Indeed, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis contend that
the major questions exception as enunciated in King is so potentially disruptive to administrative law doctrine that the exception should be applied only
by the Supreme Court, not by other federal courts lower in the judicial
hierarchy.38
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2206 (2016).
32 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (“[Chevron] is premised on the theory that a statute’s
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” (quoting FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000))).
33 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
34 See Steve R. Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King
and Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19; Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, Essay, King v.
Burwell: What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72.
35 See Walker, supra note 13.
36 Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 796 (“Unless Congress clearly states its preference
for agency resolution, [King] will be understood to have ousted agencies from their Chevron role of resolving statutory ambiguity whenever that ambiguity presents a ‘major’
question.”).
37 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232–33.
38 See Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 830; cf. Barnett & Walker, supra note 5, at
159–62 (responding to Coenen and Davis by stressing the value of permitting lower courts
to “percolat[e]” the major questions exception).
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All this anxiety has been augmented considerably by the King opinion’s
opacity on why the major questions exception applied in that case—and
hence its potential for acting as ammunition in future challenges to consequential agency action. As Lisa Heinzerling has pointed out, there is no
“general presumption that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates big
questions to agencies; many prior cases expose the factual inaccuracy of such
a presumption.”39 King seemed to “carv[e] out a category of cases as to
which it simply will not tolerate ambiguity,”40 but it is difficult to decipher
what exactly falls into that critical “category of cases.” Does the category have
any rule-like boundaries capable of generalization in future cases?41 Or,
alternatively, was the King Court simply applying “an infinitely flexible doctrinal escape-hatch [from] Chevron,”42 an elastic loophole that threatens to
become “tautological” because—as Abigail Moncrieff has argued—“pretty
much anything Congress legislates could satisfy a standard of ‘economic and
political significance’”?43
I think that King does have meaningful boundaries.44 Not all “elephants
in mouseholes” are alike. Some “elephants”—in fact, most of them—involve
regulation of private parties’ conduct; much rarer are “elephants” that trigger spending by the government. King’s elephant was of this latter type. In
King, the authority claimed by the Agency was the authority to answer a question in a way that would dictate billions of dollars of future spending by the
39 Heinzerling, supra note 11, at 1959; see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232 (noting
that “Chevron itself” was a case that “hardly involved an interstitial question”).
40 Heinzerling, supra note 11, at 1959.
41 See id. at 1956 (“[King’s] interpretive principle . . . can be stated as follows: when an
agency charged with administering an ambiguous statutory provision answers a question of
great economic and political significance, the question is central to the underlying statutory regime, and the Court believes the agency is not an expert in the matter, the Court
may ‘hesitate’ to apply the Chevron framework at all in determining statutory meaning.”);
id. (“Note the complexity of this interpretive principle, with its five different features:
ambiguity in the statute, economic and political significance, centrality to the statutory
regime, the interpreting agency’s status as an expert in the field, and complete withdrawal
of the Chevron framework.”); see also Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequence of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 64 (“Combined with Brown & Williamson
Tobacco itself, one can envision King as launching a new extraordinary cases exception from
Chevron’s scope that considers whether the question at issue (1) is central or interstitial to
the statutory scheme, (2) is economically and politically significant, and (3) implicates the
agency’s core expertise.”).
42 Abigail R. Moncrieff, King, Chevron, and the Age of Textualism, 95 B.U. L. REV.
ANNEX 1, 4 (2015).
43 Id. at 7.
44 To my knowledge, the reading of King urged here has not been advanced elsewhere
in the burgeoning literature on the case. In addition to sources already cited in preceding
footnotes, other notable contributions include Kevin O. Leske, Essay, Major Questions About
the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479 (2016); Richard Primus,
Essay, The Cost of the Text, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1649, 1655–56 & n.20 (2017); Nathan
Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine,
49 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2016).
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federal government.45 King’s elephant created not an obligation to the federal government, or to another private party, but a financial obligation running from the federal government.46 King’s elephant might thus be thought
of as a “white elephant”—as fable has it, a type of elephant that entails especially great expense to maintain.
In this respect, King differs sharply from other major questions cases,
which involved claims of agency regulatory authority, but not claims of agency
authority over federal spending. Let us pause to review this herd of elephants and check them against King’s. Brown & Williamson concerned
agency power to regulate tobacco products—the imposition of labeling obligations and marketing rules—but no financial consequences for the government budget.47 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T involved agency
power to authorize companies not to file their tariffs—a rule that adjusted
telecommunications companies’ obligations, but that would not have generated any federal spending.48 Whitman involved agency power to consider
costs in setting air quality standards—i.e., the scope of agency power to
impose regulatory burdens on polluters—but that elephant, too, involved
obligations to the government and not spending by the government.49 Gonzales v. Oregon concerned the Attorney General’s authority to interpret the
Controlled Substances Act to prohibit doctors from using regulated drugs to
enable physician-assisted suicide;50 the case implicated regulation of physician conduct, but not spending by the federal government. In short, none of
these cases involved the particular type of elephant at issue in King—a regulation that would trigger a large amount of federal spending; there is not a
white elephant in the lot.
The one partial outlier from this set is Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA,51 which rejected the EPA’s interpretation of its authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.
Tellingly, the UARG Court stated that “[t]he fact that EPA’s greenhouse-gasinclusive interpretation . . . would place plainly excessive demands on limited
governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting it.”52 That the
EPA’s reading of the Clean Air Act entailed such “resource-intensive” and
“significant” “procedural burdens on the permitting authority and [the]
45 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
46 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114); Walker,
supra note 13, at 1101 (“At oral argument, it was Justice Kennedy who seemed to raise the
major questions point” noting that “[I]f it’s ambiguous then we think of Chevron, . . . [b]ut
it seems to me a drastic step for us to say that the Department of Internal Revenue and its
director can make this call one way or the other when there are, what, billions of dollars of
subsidies involved here? Hundreds of millions?” (alterations in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 74)).
47 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127 (2000).
48 See 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
49 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
50 See 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
51 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
52 Id. at 2444 (emphasis added).
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EPA” was “good reason” enough to reject that reading.53 Only then did the
UARG Court continue on to hold—citing, inter alia, Brown & Williamson and
MCI—that the EPA’s “interpretation is also unreasonable because it would
bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory
authority without clear congressional authorization.”54 What is noteworthy
here is that the UARG Court considered the “plainly excessive demands on
limited governmental resources” generated by the agency interpretation as
itself constituting an independent ground for withholding deference to the
EPA’s interpretation.55 Like this underdiscussed aspect of UARG, King did
not accord deference to an agency interpretation that placed “excessive
demands on limited governmental resources”—in King, federal dollars.56
Although King did not invoke this body of precedent, King’s reasoning
also finds support in a distinct line of statutory interpretation cases that
address federal spending and Congress’s power of the purse.57 In 1922, Justice Holmes wrote that “[a] liability in any case is not to be imposed upon a
government without clear words. . . . [A]nd where, as here, the liability would
mount to great sums, only the plainest language could warrant a Court in
taking it to be imposed.”58 In 1948, United States v. Zazove59 adhered to that
principle in considering whether a statute that authorized life insurance payments to servicemen’s beneficiaries should be construed to create a greater
financial liability on the government, as the respondent contended, or a
lesser one, as specified by a Veterans Administration regulation.60 The Court
reasoned that “the statute is an expression of legislative intent rather than
the embodiment of an agreement between Congress and the insured person”
and that “[o]nly the intent of Congress, which in this case is the insurer,
need be ascertained to fix the meaning of the statutory terms.”61 Because
there was nothing in the statute to show that Congress intended for the
United States to bear that “huge cost,” the beneficiary of the policy lost:
53 Id. at 2443–44.
54 Id. at 2444 (emphasis added).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 A distinct line of doctrine addresses contexts in which courts order the government
to make expenditures for constitutional reasons, such as when the underinclusiveness of a
government benefits program violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89–90 (1979); Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 184
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
58 Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922); see also United States v.
N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947) (“Thus there can be no consent by
implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers
of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not
translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive
the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed.”); Schellfeffer
v. United States, 343 F.2d 936, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (rejecting statutory interpretation that
“would impose on the United States a very large financial burden”).
59 334 U.S. 602 (1948).
60 Id. at 616–17.
61 Id. at 611.
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Congress nowhere specified that the United States would bear the huge cost
of the enhanced liability that it would necessarily have anticipated had it
impressed upon [the statute] the meaning that respondent finds there; and
that striking omission is persuasive . . . that no generosity of this magnitude
was contemplated.62

The government estoppel cases are also relevant here. In Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond,63 the Court rejected the contention that a commonlaw principle of estoppel could succeed in forcing “a claim for payment of
money from the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory appropriation,”64 reasoning that “not a single case has upheld an estoppel claim against the Government for the payment of money.”65 In other words, even good faith
executive branch misinterpretation of statutory authority that engenders reasonable detrimental reliance cannot force government spending.66
The D.C. Circuit has also policed the intersection between deference
and spending without deferring to interpretations reached by agencies. In
Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit declined to defer under
Chevron to “agency action that creates a broad class of takings claims, compensable in the Court of Claims,” because such deference would unacceptably “allow agencies to use statutory silence or ambiguity to expose the
Treasury to liability both massive and unforeseen.”67 In U.S. Department of
Navy v. FLRA, the D.C. Circuit said that interpretations of appropriations statutes by agencies or by the Comptroller General are not entitled to deference;
although the latter’s view may be considered “to the extent it is persuasive, ‘it
is the court that has the last word.’ ”68 Most recently, in Bread for the City v.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, a unanimous panel rejected the challenger’s
more expensive reading of language in an appropriations law and instead
endorsed the more natural—and less expensive—reading endorsed by the
Department of Agriculture by relying on the court’s own de novo interpretation of the statute.69

62 Id. at 616–17.
63 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
64 Id. at 424.
65 Id. at 427. The Richmond Court did preserve the possibility that “some type of
‘affirmative misconduct’ might give rise to estoppel against the Government.” Id. at 421.
66 See id. at 428.
67 Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
68 U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (quoting Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see
also In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
69 Bread for the City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 872 F.3d 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see
also Bread for the City, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d at 335 (“While Congress may be regularly
criticized for how it spends the taxpayers’ funds, it is certainly not known, thank
goodness, for miswriting statutes to obtusely authorize—if not mandate—the
expenditure of hundreds of millions of unappropriated funds.”).
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There is a constitutionally inflected clear statement principle at work in
these cases and others like them,70 and it is a principle that sets King cleanly
apart from the other major questions cases. While it is certainly true that “no
simple line separates minor or interstitial from major questions,”71 a simple
line does separate cases where federal spending is triggered from cases where
federal spending is not triggered. While it is certainly true that there is no
“general presumption that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates big
questions to agencies,”72 there is a “general presumption” that when Congress intends to create financial liabilities upon the federal government it will
speak clearly. The latter type of implicit delegation is thus different than the
type of implicit delegation usually at issue in a Chevron case; they are two
different breeds of elephant.
Of course, a pure clear statement rule of statutory interpretation concerning federal spending cannot explain King and, at first blush, may seem
to run counter to King. Clear statement rules generally constrain judicial
interpretation as well as agency interpretation. And the King Court, in the
end, found that Congress had authorized the spending, even though reaching that conclusion took considerable spadework.73 The Court was just not
willing to reach the identical outcome by according Chevron deference to the
agency.
This bivalent approach—allowing a federal court to find spending, but
disallowing an agency from finding spending, based on identical statutory
fodder—seems inconsistent in its treatment of courts and agencies, but its
underlying logic makes sense. If statutes should not be read to impose “[a]
liability . . . [of] great sums” on the federal government absent “clear
words,”74 then it is risky to accord agencies Chevron deference in their interpretations of statutes that only arguably or ambiguously create great financial
70 Obviously, the constitutional principle at stake here is Congress’s power of the
purse. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 24 F.3d at 1445 (“Where administrative interpretation of a
statute creates [an identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute would necessarily constitute a taking], use of a narrowing construction prevents executive encroachment on Congress’s exclusive powers to raise revenue and to appropriate funds.” (first
citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes.”);
and then citing id. art. I, § 9 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”))); California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119,
1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Looming over this whole discussion is the fact that the parties are
disputing the meaning of an appropriations statute, not just any statute. . . . [T]he role of
the Appropriations Clause in enforcing the constitutional separation of powers provides
reason for caution in adopting a reading of an appropriations statute broader than the one
most obviously provided by the text.”); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F.
Supp. 3d 53, 73 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The political tug of war anticipated by the Constitution
depends upon Article I, § 9, cl. 7 having some force; otherwise the purse strings would be
cut.”).
71 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2606.
72 Heinzerling, supra note 11, at 1959.
73 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–96 (2015).
74 Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922) (“A liability in any case
is not to be imposed upon a Government without clear words. . . . [A]nd where, as here,
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liabilities for the federal government. An agency exercising discretion to
choose between alternative permissible readings of ambiguous statutory text
may opt for the reading that authorizes spending because the agency believes
that good policy reasons exist to interpret the statute to authorize the spending.75 When a court looks at the statute de novo, however, it allows the
spending only if the court is persuaded that Congress decided the payment
should be made,76 because Congress is ultimately the institution that the
Constitution entrusts with “absolute” authority over federal spending.77 In
the end, that is what the King Court did: after reviewing the ACA’s overall
text, structure, and purpose, the Court eventually determined that the statute
“compel[led]” the conclusion that Congress did make tax credits available to
purchasers on the federal exchange.78
the liability would mount to great sums, only the plainest language could warrant a Court
in taking it to be imposed.”).
75 See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 175, 181,
183, 186 (D.D.C. 2016) (rejecting the Secretaries’ arguments for spending on cost-sharing
reductions, which included, inter alia, arguments that were “contextual,” based on
“[s]tructure and design,” “[u]nintended consequences,” “nonsensical and undesirable
results,” and “contemporary understanding[s]”); see also Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2598
(“When statutes are ambiguous, a judgment about their meaning rests on no brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but on assessments of both policy and principle. . . . So, at least,
Chevron holds.”); id. at 2610 (“Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that
resolution of statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle.”).
76 I avoid using the locution of “intent” here, because—as Professor Victoria Nourse
has pointed out—the “term ‘legislative intent’ is obscuring . . . . Intent is simply a constitutional heuristic used to remind judges that, in the end, it is not their decision, but Congress’s.” Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by
the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76, 80–85 (2012) (explaining why “[i]n its best sense, ‘legislative
intent’ is a message for judges about judging, not an accurate or even necessary description
of Congress”). Courts, of course, routinely speak of congressional intent, including in the
context of deciding whether federal money can properly be spent. See, e.g., Rochester Pure
Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that courts have exercised “equitable powers” to “give[ ] effect to congressional intent by permitting timely
claimants to recover from funds that Congress set aside for that purpose,” and distinguishing those cases from the situation in which Congress, “with full knowledge” of a pending
claim, rescinds an appropriation). King was no exception. See Manning, supra note 2, at
2399–400 (“[King] represents a long tradition of the Court’s taking a hard, even insoluble
question and asserting that it has identified what Congress intended to do about that very
question.”).
77 See U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“Congress’s control over federal expenditures is ‘absolute.’” (quoting Rochester Pure
Waters Dist., 960 F. 2d at 185)).
78 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93 (“Here, the statutory scheme compels us to reject petitioners’ interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any
State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress
designed the Act to avoid.”); see also Primus, supra note 44, at 1656 n.20 (“Given the statute
overall, giving legal force to the plain meaning of section 1311 would have been unreasonable. . . . Considered as a whole, the ACA clearly points to the result sought by the
government.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL402.txt

2018]

unknown

KING’s

domain

Seq: 13

6-JUN-18

13:54

1431

One might take issue, as the King dissenters did,79 with how the King
Court ultimately read the ACA. More broadly, one might take issue with the
idea that courts are able to accurately parse legislative purpose and statutory
text, or one might doubt whether courts will carry out that task impartially,
instead of just swapping in their own ideological preferences. Alternatively,
without doubting judicial capacity or good faith, one may simply think that
agencies have greater expertise and democratic accountability than courts
for resolving statutory ambiguities,80 including ambiguities that might trigger
large amounts of federal spending.
All of these are reasonable objections that might be levied against the
bivalent approach on display in King. I will mention only four points of particular relevance in this context. First, Congress legislates in light of existing
precedent,81 and given the long tradition of clear statement cases around
spending, it is reasonable to presume that Congress legislates with awareness
of the fact that implicit delegations as to spending will be treated differently
by the judiciary than other kinds of implicit delegations. Second, in contrast
to the mine-run of federal statutes with respect to which it does not express
significant interpretive preferences, Congress has stated that appropriations
statutes should be construed to authorize spending only when the statute
“specifically” so states,82 which lends support to the idea that agencies should
not be able to leverage statutory ambiguities to trigger spending.83 Third,
given that appropriations laws are now the one type of law that Congress can
be relied upon to enact, Congress can perhaps more readily correct judicial
mistakes concerning the meaning of spending statutes than it can correct
judicial mistakes about the meaning of regulatory statutes. Fourth—and this
is offered more as a pragmatic point than as one of principle—undoing
King’s allocation of interpretive authority over statutes that trigger spending
will be an uphill battle. Though the King dissenters condemned the majority
79 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Rather than rewriting the law
under the pretense of interpreting it, the Court should have left it to Congress to decide
what to do about the Act’s limitation of tax credits to state Exchanges.”).
80 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it
is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
81 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280, 2299 n.88 (2006) (“The Court presumes that Congress enacts statutes against the
backdrop of established rules of construction.”).
82 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2012) (“A law may be construed to make an appropriation out
of the Treasury or to authorize making a contract for the payment of money in excess of an
appropriation only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made or that such a
contract may be made.”).
83 Cf. Manning, supra note 2, at 2432–33 (“Congress can provide a way out of the conceptual stalemate by specifying its own preferences about the way courts should read its
handiwork. . . . Congress has the discretion, within a broad range, to specify the means by
which it wishes the courts to decipher and carry into execution its commands.”).
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for misreading the ACA, all nine Justices agreed that the Court’s standard of
review should be de novo, not deferential.
In any event, setting normative questions aside, King’s significance seems
to me apparent. The Court in King rejected a key simplifying assumption
that animates Chevron: it refused to treat an implicit delegation of the power
to commit large amounts of federal money as interchangeable with other
implicit delegations. Instead, the Court ultimately had to conclude—and did
conclude—that Congress authorized the spending on a de novo reading of
the statute. In so holding, King carved out of Chevron’s domain agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory authority that cause large amounts of federal spending.
This, I argue, is King’s domain. But—and this is an important “but”—
that is its whole domain. King does not entail that courts should apply the
major questions exception at Step Zero to any and all regulatory schemes
that leverage implicit delegations to impose major regulatory burdens upon
private parties, even if those schemes create billions of dollars in private costs.
Put another way, to keep King within its proper domain, future courts facing
challenges to agency action ought to distinguish between (a) implicit delegations to agencies to regulate private conduct and (b) implicit delegations to
agencies to commit the federal government to spend large amounts of
money. And they ought to regard King as controlling only in the latter type
of case—cases in which “Step Zero”84 involves lots of the federal government’s “zeroes.” King need not be read as an across-the-board directive that
courts should invoke Step Zero and sidestep Chevron deference whenever an
administrative determination has “major” effects. Courts should give King
the force it demands within the domain it addressed but refrain from treating the case as a reason for withholding Chevron deference to agency action
that falls outside of King’s domain.
Understood in these terms, King would have limited effects on many
administrative law cases that involve Chevron. Indeed, it would have limited
effects on many administrative law cases involving federal spending. King left
entirely untouched the cases that circumscribe judicial review in cases where
Congress has clearly authorized agencies to spend money. Under Lincoln v.
Vigil, where a statute makes a lump-sum appropriation to an agency to spend
at its discretion, the Court will not interfere with—or even review—the
agency’s choice; there is no law to apply to such a choice.85 Under Citizens to
84 See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 873; Sunstein, supra note 4.
85 See 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion. After all, the very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what
it sees as the most effective or desirable way.”); id. at 193 (“[A]s long as the agency allocates
funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory objectives, § 701(a)(2)
gives the courts no leave to intrude. ‘[T]o [that] extent,’ the decision to allocate funds ‘is
committed to agency discretion by law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a))).
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Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, when Congress appropriates money to an
agency to spend if specified statutory criteria are met, the agency’s decision is
subject to review only for whether it considered those criteria and applied
them in a manner that was not arbitrary and capricious—a form of review
that is “searching and careful,” but ultimately “narrow.”86 The lesson of King
is implicated, I argue, only where the agency claims that a statute implicitly
delegates to the agency the power to cause large amounts of federal money
to be spent.
II. DÉTENTE

AND

DEFERENCE

The reading of King just advanced splits it off from the other major questions cases. The other major questions cases did not involve federal spending, and they were not Step Zero holdings: they held that the relevant statute
foreclosed what the agency wanted to accomplish.87 King, in contrast,
involved a statute that “compel[led]”88 the result the agency wanted to reach
anyway—the spending of billions of federal tax credits—but the Court at
Step Zero refused to let the agency reach that result. If courts lump together
King with the other major questions cases, and treat them in pari passu as
Step Zero cases, the consequence will be to skip the other major questions
cases forward—to Step Zero—and thereby unnecessarily erode Chevron’s
domain.
To see this dynamic in action, consider a recent dissenting opinion from
Judge Brett Kavanaugh in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA),89 in
which he described what he referred to as the “major rules doctrine.” Judge
Kavanaugh correctly noted that King “is somewhat different from the prototypical major rules cases because the agency in that particular rule was not
seeking to regulate or de-regulate (as opposed to tax or subsidize) some
major private activity.”90 Explaining that King “concerned the scope of government subsidies under the health care statute,” Judge Kavanaugh treated
King as standing for “the distinct proposition that Chevron deference may not
apply when an agency interprets a major government benefits or appropriations provision of a statute.”91 But, despite splitting King off in this fashion,
Judge Kavanaugh nonetheless described King as “appl[ying] a form of the
86 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“To make this finding the court must consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” (citations omitted)).
87 See supra text accompanying notes 5–8, 47–56.
88 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93.
89 See 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). For an insightful analysis, see Steinberg, supra note 5.
90 USTA, 855 F.3d at 421 n.2 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc); cf. id. at 402–03 (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
91 USTA, 855 F.3d at 421 n.2 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL402.txt

1434

unknown

Seq: 16

notre dame law review

6-JUN-18

13:54

[vol. 93:4

major rules doctrine.”92 He then summarized this (singular) “major rules
doctrine” as follows: “If an agency wants to exercise expansive regulatory
authority over some major social or economic activity . . . an ambiguous grant
of statutory authority is not enough. Congress must clearly authorize an
agency to take such a major regulatory action.”93
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion illustrates the consequences for Chevron of
lumping together King with the other major questions cases to produce a
robust major questions exception that applies at Step Zero. Judge Sri
Srinivasan’s concurrence in denial of rehearing en banc noted that the statute did not foreclose the possibility that internet service was a telecommunications service; in Brand X, the Court had treated the Communications Act as
not compelling the conclusion that internet service providers were telecommunications providers.94 The ambiguity in the statute, Judge Srinivasan
stated, was an ambiguity that Brand X “definitively” treated as delegated to
the agency to resolve—even if the resultant decision “amounts to a major
rule.”95 But by interposing the major questions exception at Step Zero,
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion denies the possibility of such a delegation, reasoning instead that a finding of statutory ambiguity “cannot be the source of
the FCC’s authority to classify Internet service as a telecommunications service” and that “under the major rules doctrine, Brand X’s finding of statutory
ambiguity is a bar to the FCC’s authority to classify Internet service as a telecommunications service.”96 On his view, unless Congress “clearly authorize[s]” an agency to issue a major rule, the major rule is unlawful.97 From
the boundaries set by Chevron, Judge Kavanaugh carves a significant exception: “Under our system of separation of powers, an agency may act only
pursuant to statutory authority and may not exceed that authority. For major
rules, moreover, the agency must have clear congressional authorization.”98
By thus shifting the burden of proof, Judge Kavanaugh’s Step Zero conception of the major questions exception would have sizable consequences
92 Id.
93 Id. at 421.
94 See id. at 384 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The
issue in Brand X was whether the Communications Act compelled the FCC to classify cable
broadband ISPs as telecommunications providers subject to regulatory treatment as common carriers. The Court answered that question no.”).
95 Id. at 385 (“If we assume that the FCC’s decision to treat broadband ISPs as common carriers amounts to a major rule, the question then is whether the agency clearly has
authority under the Act to make that choice. In Brand X, the Supreme Court definitively—
and authoritatively, for our purposes as an inferior court—answered that question yes.”).
96 Id. at 425 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
97 Id. at 426 (“Brand X’s finding of ambiguity by definition means that Congress has
not clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net neutrality rule. And that means that the net
neutrality rule is unlawful under the major rules doctrine.”).
98 Id. (emphasis omitted); compare id., with City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297
(2013) (“[T]he question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of
a statute is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory
authority.” (emphasis omitted)).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL402.txt

2018]

unknown

KING’s

domain

Seq: 17

6-JUN-18

13:54

1435

upon deference doctrine. The approach laid out in his opinion would have
done more than just invalidate the FCC’s net neutrality rule99—it would nullify Chevron whenever a statute contains an ambiguity and a court regards an
agency’s regulatory action premised on that ambiguity as “major.”100 On the
critical question of what counts as “major” to Judge Kavanaugh, it seems noteworthy that Judge Kavanaugh has acquired a small posse of elephants
already.101 This fact does not seem accidental in light of doubts he has
expressed concerning the wisdom of Chevron.102 In a 2016 book review in
the Harvard Law Review, Judge Kavanaugh identified “two significant questions” about the relationship between King and Chevron: “First, how major
must the questions be for Chevron not to apply? Second, if Chevron is inappropriate for cases involving major questions, why is it still appropriate for

99 Subsequently, the FCC has acted to undo net neutrality. See In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-108 (Jan. 4, 2018).
100 Over a decade ago, Cass Sunstein anticipated and criticized Judge Kavanaugh’s version of the major questions exception, arguing that reading MCI and Brown & Williamson
to apply at Step Zero rather than Step One would threaten Chevron and disregard the
“linchpins” of Chevron by treating agency expertise and accountability as irrelevant to the
resolution of major questions. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 243. As noted, I have argued
that particular reasons exist to question the ordinary assumptions of agency expertise and
accountability when the executive branch interprets ambiguous statutory authority to trigger the spending of money on broad-scale economic entitlements. See Sohoni, supra note
16. Those reasons apply to a subset of the policymaking within King’s domain; they do not
extend beyond that domain to the realm of general regulatory policymaking.
101 In his USTA dissent, Judge Kavanaugh noted that the D.C. Circuit “has also
employed the major rules doctrine,” citing two of his own earlier opinions for that court.
USTA, 855 F.3d at 421 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc) (first citing District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Labor, 819 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
and then citing Loving v. IRS, 724 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). In neither did the D.C.
Circuit apply the major questions at Step Zero. See District of Columbia, 819 F.3d at 454
(“To use the administrative law vernacular, the Department’s interpretation fails Chevron
step one because it is foreclosed by the statute. In any event, the Department’s
interpretation would likewise fail Chevron step two because it is unreasonable in light of
the statute’s text, structure, and purpose.”); Loving, 742 F.3d at 1022 (“Put in Chevron
parlance, the IRS’s interpretation fails at Chevron step 1 because it is foreclosed by the
statute. In any event, the IRS’s interpretation would also fail at Chevron step 2 because it
is unreasonable in light of the statute’s text, history, structure, and con-text.”). Loving
invoked language from Brown & Williamson as the fifth of six considerations relevant to the
court’s Step One holding. See id. at 1021. In District of Columbia, the invocation of Brown
& Williamson occurred in dictum that “buttresse[d]” a conclusion reached on two other
rationales. District of Columbia, 819 F.3d at 446. Neither of these two cases endorsed
anything like the Step Zero major rules exception embraced by Judge Kavanaugh’s
USTA opinion.
102 See Judge Brett Kavanaugh, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Keynote
Address at the Center for the Study of Administrative State: Justice Scalia and Deference
(June 2, 2016), https://vimeo.com/169758593?utm_source=email&utm_medium=vimeocliptranscode-201504&utm_campaign=28749.
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cases involving less major but still important questions?”103 By incrementally
lowering the bar for what constitutes a “major” case—thus answering the first
question—Judge Kavanaugh implicitly answers the second question: that
Chevron is not appropriate in any case of any importance.
Indeed, in recent months Judge Kavanaugh flirted again with the major
questions exception in a case involving the FCC’s authority concerning the
languages that broadcasters must use to broadcast emergency alerts.104 The
FCC has not required multilingual emergency broadcasts, and the petitioners
argued that the Communications Act’s general “statement of purpose” provision required the agency to adopt such a rule.105 Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion first noted that the statute did not require the FCC to order multilingual
emergency broadcasts.106 But then—citing Brown & Williamson—he went on
to state that “[i]f Congress intended to require multi-lingual communications
in general, and multi-lingual emergency alerts in particular, we would expect
Congress to have spoken far more clearly than it has done in this general
statement of policy.”107 He also stated that because no litigant had challenged whether the FCC had the authority to require multilingual emergency
alerts by broadcasters, the court would “therefore assume without deciding
that the FCC possesses such authority.”108 If the FCC does ever get around to
issuing such a rule,109 this opinion thus leaves the door invitingly open for a
broadcaster to claim that because Congress has not “spoken far more clearly”
about “requir[ing] . . . multi-lingual emergency alerts in particular,” the FCC
lacks the authority to address the issue.110
It is hard to think of this implication of the opinion while keeping an
entirely straight face. But the joke is on Chevron. If Congress’s failure to
speak to “multi-lingual emergency alerts in particular”111 is the sort of statutory silence that can bring the major questions exception into play—as Judge
103 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2152
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
104 Multicultural Media, Telecom & Internet Council v. FCC, 873 F.3d 932 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
105 Id. at 935.
106 See id. at 936.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 936 n.1.
109 This seems unlikely, not least because Judge Kavanaugh also invited the agency to
reject imposing any requirement on broadcasters. Id. at 939 (“Given all of the legal and
factual circumstances surrounding this issue at the present time, it likely would be reasonable for the FCC to flatly say that the alert originators (the federal, state, and local government entities) are the parties responsible for deciding whether and when to issue
emergency alerts in languages in addition to English, and to leave the issue with those
government entities.”).
110 Id. at 936; cf. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 426 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Under our system of separation of powers, an agency may act only pursuant to statutory authority and
may not exceed that authority. For major rules, moreover, the agency must have clear
congressional authorization.”).
111 Multicultural Media, 873 F.3d at 936.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL402.txt

2018]

unknown

KING’s

domain

Seq: 19

6-JUN-18

13:54

1437

Kavanaugh’s opinion appears to assume—then what is left of Chevron’s
domain?
I think it would be unfortunate if more federal judges were to endorse
(or acquiesce in)112 such efforts to expand the outer ambits and nether limits of the major questions exception. The reasons why, to my mind, have to
do both with the nature of the judicial function in articulating deference
doctrine and with the particular moment in which we today find ourselves—a
moment of radical disagreement concerning the administrative state’s powers and legitimacy.113
Begin with the judicial role in formulating and refining rules of deference. Chevron is not a constitutionally mandated rule.114 Although the
regime of Chevron deference may be constitutionally motivated115 and serve
important democratic values,116 the Chevron framework is ultimately a species
of federal common law.117 To be sure, it is a species of common law upon
which Congress has presumably come to rely.118 But at bottom, Chevron is
purely common law in the sense that Congress can override it if it chooses.119
Indeed, when Congress has wished to displace Chevron, it has legislated
around it expressly in particular statutes.120
Today, Congress is considering various bills that could restrict agencies
from promulgating major rules and cut back on or get rid of judicial deference altogether.121 Other scholars have insightfully described those propos112 In Multicultural Media, Judge Kavanaugh’s oblique invocation of the major questions
exception appeared in dictum, but it was dictum by a unanimous panel. The partial concurrence and dissent by Judge Millett did not take issue with this portion of the panel’s
opinion. See id. at 940 (Millett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–33 (2017).
114 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 81, at 2299 (“[T]he Court has never suggested
that the Chevron rule is constitutionally required.”).
115 See id. (referring to Chevron as a “constitutionally inspired” drafting presumption
that helps to promote the “background premises of constitutional democracy”).
116 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 275
(2011) (justifying Chevron as a self-imposed constraint or resistance norm that makes it
more difficult for a court to “dictate[ ] outcomes in policy-laden decisions”).
117 Herz, supra note 24, at 1877 (“Chevron’s command to accept any reasonable agency
interpretation is in practice a form of self-regulation. The Court made it up and imposed it
on itself; it is administrative common law.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2012).
118 But see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 785 (2010) (“No one
rationally orders their affairs in reliance on Chevron deference.”).
119 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2589 (“If Congress wanted to repudiate Chevron, it could
do precisely that.”); see Mila Sohoni, A Bureaucracy—If You Can Keep It, 131 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 13, 24–25 (2017).
120 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
121 See Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1599 (2018); Metzger, supra note 113.
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als and explored their potential consequences.122 My aim here is not to
evaluate these proposals, but rather to stress a different point—the implications of those ongoing legislative efforts for the judicial role. As Congress
weighs its options for transformative administrative law reform and reaches
toward a resolution of these questions, it is sensible for federal courts—
which, to repeat, are here acting as common-law courts—to maintain stability
in the law on judicial deference as Congress deliberates. It is not as though
Congress is unaware of the arguments for and against reforming or rejecting
Chevron deference to administrative agencies,123 or deaf to the constituencies
that would favor or oppose such a possibly momentous step. It is not as
though Congress has no responsibility for administrative procedure or no
capacity to alter the standards of judicial review of agency action. In cases
where the courts could have developed federal common law in a particular
direction, but Congress was poised to consider the subject, the federal courts
have time and again stayed their hand and awaited action from Congress.124
Maintaining the status quo is today equally appropriate.125 The courts
should preserve the détente between Chevron and King here outlined—a
122 See Metzger, supra note 111; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO.
L. REV. 1075 (2016).
123 See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 118, at 802.
124 See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759–60 (1998)
(“Although the Court has taken the lead in drawing the bounds of tribal immunity, Congress, subject to constitutional limitations, can alter its limits through explicit legislation.
In both fields, Congress is in a position to weigh and accommodate the competing policy
concerns and reliance interests. The capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue
by comprehensive legislation counsels some caution by us in this area. . . . In light of these
concerns, we decline to revisit our case law and choose to defer to Congress.” (citations
omitted)); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 n.11 (1994) (declining to recognize a Bivens
remedy against federal agencies in part because “Congress has considered several proposals that would have created a Bivens-type remedy directly against the Federal Government”); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947) (declining to
recognize new tort rights of contribution because “exercise of judicial power to establish
the new liability . . . would be intruding within a field properly within Congress’ control
and as to a matter concerning which it has seen fit to take no action”); id. at 315–16
(“When Congress has thought it necessary to take steps to prevent interference with federal funds, property or relations, it has taken positive action to that end. We think it would
have done so here, if that had been its desire. This it still may do, if or when it so wishes.”
(footnote omitted)). If Chevron is now governing “statutory precedent” about the APA, the
case is even stronger for courts to maintain stability in their practices until Congress acts.
See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271–73 (1979) (“[W]e
are mindful that here we deal with an interface of statutory and judge-made law. . . . By
now changing what we have already established that Congress understood to be the law,
and did not itself wish to modify, we might knock out of kilter this delicate balance. As our
cases advise, we should stay our hand in these circumstances.” (footnote omitted)).
125 I have argued elsewhere that administrative law has at times seemed to evolve in
fundamental ways even in the absence of focused deliberation by Congress on whether it
ought to change in those ways. Contrasting the role played by courts in constitutional law
and administrative law, I noted that there is little reason to think that in articulating watershed administrative law doctrines, the courts are channeling or responding to public val-
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détente under which the other major questions cases are applied, if relevant,
at Step One (or Two), to determine if the agency is acting beyond the
bounds of its statutory authority, while King, at Step Zero, is kept confined to
spending-related cases—as Congress decides whether to jettison or preserve
the extant law on judicial deference to administrative agencies. While I am
not persuaded that the inferior federal courts can properly refuse to apply
the major questions exception as a categorical matter,126 I do think that all
federal courts should handle that exception carefully by keeping King within
the bailiwick it squarely addressed. The courts can continue their “percolation”127 of these issues while still remaining mindful of the special aspects
that distinguish King from the other major questions cases and cordon it
within its own domain.
CONCLUSION
Agency action that triggers large-scale government spending on the basis
of ambiguous statutory authority falls outside Chevron’s domain; the Supreme
Court held no more than that in King. But the terse reasoning of King has
prompted some judges and litigants to regard it as authority for invoking the
major questions exception at Step Zero to eschew Chevron deference in cases
that involve not federal spending, but regulatory policymaking.
This Essay has sought to draw the boundaries of King’s domain in a way
that both best rationalizes what that opinion said and that also balances and
reconciles broader constitutional and democratic values—the value of preserving Congress’s power over the purse, as well as the value, shielded by
Chevron, of giving primacy to expert and democratically accountable agencies, rather than to courts, in the sphere of regulatory policymaking. It has
then linked this bounded reading of King to the broader principle of judicial
restraint. In this era of sharp political contestation surrounding administrative government, the federal courts should refrain from exercising their common-law powers to alter the doctrine of judicial deference as Congress
deliberates on the legislative proposals currently pending before it that
would address precisely that subject. As for Congress—well, to borrow a
phrase from Judge Kavanaugh, perhaps Congress should just “fish or cut
bait.”128 But now that’s fish, not elephants, and a different kettle of fish at
ues, whereas courts often do appear to respond to and channel public values when
articulating evolving constitutional norms. See Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution
in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 926, 973 (2016). It follows that when Congress does
take up the task of considering fundamental administrative law reform—as happens to
currently be the case—the judiciary should stay its hand.
126 Coenen & Davis, supra note 5, at 799 (“Rather than attempt to probe majorness on
a question-by-question basis, lower courts should conclude that the [major questions
exception] never applies to the statutory questions that come before them.”).
127 Cf. Barnett & Walker, supra note 5.
128 Multicultural Media, Telecom & Internet Council v. FCC, 873 F.3d 932, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
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that; a kettle of fish that most assuredly does not fall within the domain of
this Essay—“King’s Domain.”

